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applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
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Previous system dynamics work models the tipping of a series of product development 
projects into fire-fighting mode in which rework overwhelms progress. Similar dynamics also 
threaten the performance of individual development projects. The current work extends previous 
tipping point dynamics research to single projects and demonstrates how a simple, common 
feed-back structure can cause complex tipping point dynamics, trap projects in deteriorating 
modes of behavior, and cause projects to fail. Basic tipping point dynamics in single projects are 
described, analyzed, and demonstrated with the model. Previous researchers have 
recommended dynamic resource allocation policies to improve project performance threatened 
by tipping point dynamics. Several strategies for managing projects near tipping points were 
tested. Policies that were successful in preventing tipping point-based project failure include 
forecasting demand-based resource policies, policies that provided flexible resource 
adjustments, and policies that adjusted project deadlines based upon project performance. 
Keywords:  resource allocation, nuclear plant construction, project management, tipping point, 
robustness, system dynamics 
Introduction 
Although development projects are pursued to add value for their developers or users, 
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many forms, including schedule and cost overruns and unacceptable quality. Project failure is 
relatively easy to identify if the final product grossly fails to meet performance targets (e.g., 
some of NASA’s Mars probes) or if development stops before a product is completed (e.g., the 
US Department of Energy’s Supercollider project). But some projects that are completed should 
also be considered failures. An example is the Channel Tunnel (the “Chunnel”) that connects 
England and France. While the Chunnel is arguably one of the great engineering achievements 
of the last century, its final cost of $17.5 billion was more than double the original estimate of 
$7.2 billion (Kharbanda & Pinto, 1996). Chunnel usage is below the level estimated in the 
project’s feasibility study, and even the most optimistic estimates predict that the Chunnel will 
not be profitable in the next 10 to 20 years (Kharbanda & Pinto, 1996). Although a technical 
marvel, the Chunnel failed to meet two of its fundamental goals: finish with budgeted funds and 
produce a financially viable product. Failure of these large projects can have dire consequences 
for all parties associated with the project. 
Project management research has identified many factors that can lead to project failure 
including overestimation of benefits (Evans, 2005), poor stakeholder analysis (Paul, 2005), and 
errors (Busby & Hughes, 2004). Despite considerable research into these factors, clearly 
identifying project failure is difficult. Comparing differences between project performance and 
targets is a standard means of measuring project success or failure. But variations of final 
project performance from targets can be poor measures if targets are flexible. For example, US 
Department of Energy projects are not allowed to exceed Congressionally approved budget 
targets. So, targets are revised based on final performance, even in cases of gross cost 
overruns. If performance relative to original targets is a measure of project success or failure, 
some Department of Energy projects that meet final targets should be considered failures 
(USGAO, 1996, 1997). Some organizations explicitly label such projects as failures. For 
example, as part of development improvement efforts, one organization known to the authors 
labeled a set of completed projects that exceeded their cost or schedule targets by 20% or more 
as “wrecks” (as in “train wrecks”). A clear, inclusive definition of project failure is needed to 
study the performance of projects. Changes over time in the work remaining to be completed 
can provide an improved metric. Although these project backlogs are intended to generally 
decrease over time, they can stagnate or grow. Projects with backlogs that increase 
continuously over significant periods of time ultimately lead to failures to meet original project 
targets and may be terminated. The current work defines a project as a failure when its backlog 
grows continuously over an extended period of time.1  
The continuous growth of project backlogs over time can be attributed to many different 
dynamic factors. Dynamic causes identified through system dynamics include a lack of 
knowledge transfer between projects (Cooper et al., 2002), rework (Cooper, 1993a,b,c) and 
concealing rework (Ford & Sterman, 2003b), schedule pressure (Cooper, 1994; Ford & 
Sterman, 2003a), and “fire-fighting” (Repenning, 2001). A complete dynamic hypothesis of 
development project failure would include unrealistic performance targets and how negative 
feedback loops that describe responses to schedule, budget, and other pressures can trigger 
fatal reinforcing loops through productivity losses, overstaffing, inadequate training, and other 
project behaviors. Other exogenous changes that slow progress, degrade performance, and can 
lead to failure (e.g., increased regulation, scope changes, temporary work stoppage) would 
                                                
1  Active projects that stagnate, with no change in project backlog over time, are also considered failures 
but are less common. As will be shown, these conditions can be unstable, and stagnant projects are likely 
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provide the bases for additional hypotheses. The dynamic structure would also include the 
amplification of impacts due to delays in discovering rework that allow problems to be passed 
among development phases. These and other causes of project failure have been used in 
system dynamics practice, and several have been addressed in the literature.  
The current work focuses on how a particular dynamic structure, tipping points, can 
cause a common project feature, ripple effects, to generate rework and project failure. A 
development project’s ripple effects are the secondary or tertiary impacts of a change. Thomas 
and Napolitan (1994) identify indirect changes due to ripple effects due to work interdependency 
in construction projects as an important cause of project failure. They estimate the impacts on 
labor efficiency in some projects to be seven times larger than the impacts of direct changes. 
Ripple effects can be triggered by many unplanned events or conditions, including the 
exogenous factors described above. Likewise, ripple effects can have multiple types of impacts, 
including creating more work, requiring rework in previously correct work, and reducing 
productivity. We focus on the work effort created by ripple effects and disaggregate that effort 
into two forms, contamination and adding new tasks2. Contamination is work required in part of 
the existing project scope that is created due to rework being discovered in a different portion of 
the project. For example, if after a reinforced concrete column was poured, the inspectors 
discovered that the reinforcing steel used was too small, part of the beams above and below the 
column might have to be demolished in order to replace the column. Replacing the column 
(rework) requires reworking the beams even though the beams were not otherwise defective. 
The column rework contaminated the adjacent beams, but did not add any new activities to the 
project. In contrast to contamination, adding new tasks, as used here, creates development 
activities beyond the project scope due to rework required on portions of the existing project 
scope. In the column example, temporary shoring required to support the upper beams while 
the column is replaced would be new tasks. Rework on previously created new tasks can also 
contaminate and add more new tasks. For example, inadequate temporary shoring of the 
beams in the column example could damage adjacent floors (contamination) and require more 
shoring for floor repairs (more new tasks). The critical difference between contamination and 
adding new tasks is that contamination creates more rework within the existing project scope or 
previously added tasks, while adding new tasks creates development activities that were not 
previously a part of the project. The current research focuses on adding new tasks because it 
can be difficult to identify during the course of a project when created by rework and, as will be 
shown, can cause challenging project behavior and failure.  
Tipping points are one explanation of bifurcated system behavior such as project 
backlogs that diminish and lead to success or grow and lead to failure. A tipping point is a 
threshold condition that, when crossed, shifts the dominance of the feedback loops that control 
a process (Sterman, 2000). Systems tend to remain stable as long as conditions remain “below” 
the tipping point, and controlling feedback is dominant (Sterman, 2000, p. 306). But when 
conditions cross the tipping point, behavior can become (temporarily) unstable and, in the case 
of projects, lead to failure. Social physiologists have used tipping points to describe an 
unexpected spread of disease, a dramatic change in the crime rate in a city, and an increase in 
the number of teenage smokers despite a campaign of increased awareness (Gladwell, 2000). 
                                                
2 As used here, scope refers to the tasks, measured in work packages, that, when approved and 
released, provide a specified performance; work is an amount of development effort, also measured in 
work packages. Rework and adding new tasks cause the work required to complete the project to exceed 
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System dynamics can be used to elucidate tipping points and their impacts on systems in 
several ways: 1) by specifying, formalizing, and explaining structures that create tipping points, 
2) by describing behaviors resulting from tipping points, and 3) by developing policies for 
managing systems with tipping points. Here we investigate whether a combination of a tipping 
point structure and ripple effects can explain the failure of some large, complex development 
projects.   
The current work examines the generation of tipping point dynamics due to ripple effects 
in single project development systems and tests strategies and policies for resistance to project 
failure. Challenges posed by tipping points in single projects are discussed next. Two examples 
of tipping point failure in the nuclear power industry are presented. Then, a model of a single-
product development project is used to examine the impact of ripple effects on project success. 
Exogenous, endogenous, and combined drivers of behavior modes are followed by testing 
policies for tipping point solutions, and the use of robustness as a measure of potential project 
failure is tested. The conclusion discusses managerial implications and research opportunities.     
Project Management Challenges near Tipping Points 
Complex development projects are difficult to manage because of the dynamic nature of 
project systems (Lyneis et al., 2001). A project manager’s ability to understand these non-linear 
feedbacks is limited.  Most project management tools available, such as the critical path 
method, are linear and cannot adequately predict the effect increased rework and added new 
tasks has on a project. Systems dynamics is more suited to the modeling of development 
dynamics. Such models must include iterative flows of work, distinct development activities and 
available work constraints both within and among development phases. The existing system 
dynamics models of projects (which include process structures) have focused on the roles of 
two development activities. Cooper (1994, 1993a,b,c, 1980) first—and several researchers 
subsequently (e.g. Kim, 1988; Abdel-Hamid, 1984; Richardson & Pugh, 1981)—modeled two 
development activities by distinguishing between initial completion and rework. This distinction 
allows the effect of rework on a project to be studied.  
Similar structures and conditions may drive some individual development projects. Many 
product development projects are managed largely in isolation from other projects and can fail 
due to dynamics solely within or near a single project. Therefore, the explanation of tipping point 
impacts on project performance needs to be expanded to single project design and 
management. The current work extends the multi-project work by Repenning (2001) and Black 
and Repenning (2001) to single development projects. We use a system dynamics project 
model to examine the effects of ripple effect-induced tipping point dynamics on single project 
behavior and performance. This work contributes a new explanation for the failure of some 
large, individual development projects. The understanding of development project dynamics is 
advanced by proposing and initially testing the ability of a specific project structure to generate 
tipping point dynamics. That understanding is the basis for proposing and testing policies for 
preventing or managing projects that are vulnerable to failure due to tipping point dynamics.  
Tipping Point Dynamics in Nuclear Power Plant Construction 
The first commercial nuclear plant to come on-line in the United States was Dresden 1, 
located in Illinois, in 1959 (NRC, 1982). Between 1959 – 1969, twelve nuclear plants were 
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1981, the average duration nearly tripled, reaching 131 months in 1981 (NRC, 1982). While the 
plants constructed during this time were higher capacity units (i.e., bigger) than earlier projects, 
most researchers identify the ever increasing (and ever changing) number of governmental 
regulations imposed on nuclear plants as the root cause for cost and duration increases in 
nuclear plant construction (Lake, 2002; Kharbanda & Pinto, 1996; Feldman et al., 1988; 
Lillington, 2004; Friedrich et al., 1987). Examining construction records from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission from this period provide two examples of possible tipping point dynamic 
failure. 
The first example of a project that crossed this tipping point is the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s (TVA) Watts Bar nuclear power plant units 1 and 2. TVA began the construction of 
the Watts Bar facility in December of 1972 (NRC, 1982). Originally the facility was to consist of 
two 1165 MW units that were to both be on-line by the middle of 1977 (NRC, 1982). However, 
as Figure 1 shows, the two units were unable to meet the planned deadline. By mid 1977, Unit 1 
was 57% complete and Unit 2 was 49% complete. In May of 1974, the TVA reported delays due 
to the redesign of the reactor containment vessel to accommodate higher pressures, an inability 
to obtain redesigned anchor bolts and reinforcing rods, and increased time to erect steel plates 
that were thicker than the original specifications (NRC, 1982). The work created by the 
problems beyond the original scope (e.g., additional anchor bolts or steel plates) are evidence 
of adding new tasks. Work was halted in 1980 for five years to address worker safety concerns 
with the design of the plant (Lee, 1995). To address these concerns, the TVA spent nearly one 
million man hours reviewing the design of the plant (Lee, 1995). This review lead to the 
replacement of nearly three million feet of cable, 8,000 pipe supports, and 25,000 conduit 
supports (Lee, 1995). The TVA canceled Unit 2 in 1995 with the unit 61% complete (Nuclear 
Engineering International, 1995). The TVA estimated that it would cost more than the $1.7 
billion already invested in Unit 2 to complete the unit.  When Unit 1 finally came on line in 1996, 
the TVA had invested nearly $7 billion dollars in the facility (Lillington, 2004). The decrease or 
stagnation in the fraction of the total project scope that has been completed (right side of Figure 


































Figure 1.  Watts Bar Construction Progression (1973-1982) (NRC, 1982) 
The second example of tipping point failure is Philadelphia Electric’s Limerick nuclear 
power plant. Construction of the two 1065 megawatt units began in June of 1974. The 
construction schedule at the issuance of the construction permit called for Unit 1 to be 
competed in April of 1979 and for Unit 2 to be completed in September of 1980 (NRC, 1982). 
The total estimated cost for both units in 1974 was $1.2 billion (Days & Sellers, 1985). As Figure 
2 shows, both units were well behind schedule at their respective planned completion dates 
(Unit 1 at 48% complete and Unit 2 at 36% complete) (NRC, 1982). Unit 1 finally came on-line in 
August of 1985, five and a half years behind schedule with a final cost of $3.8 billion (Days & 
Sellers, 1985). Construction of Unit 2 was halted in July 1982 by order of the Pennsylvania 
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Figure 2. Limerick Nuclear Power Plant Construction (1974-1982) (NRC, 1982) 
The Philadelphia Electric company attributed at least part of the cost and schedule 
problems to added new tasks and rework, two factors which Taylor and Ford (2006) showed 
capable of generating tipping point dynamics. In a September 1980 report submitted to the 
NRC, the estimated completion date was increased by two years for Unit 2 due to an “increase 
of scope [added new tasks] due to design changes and new regulatory requirements [rework]” 
(NRC, 1982). The degrading backlog behavior pattern is displayed on Unit 2 in Figure 2 
between May 1979 and October 1980 as the percent complete begins to decrease. The 
Limerick plant was not the only plant to experience problems. A survey of senior managers at a 
firm specializing in nuclear plant construction revealed that nearly all surveys credited regulatory 
changes as the major cause for delays in both design and construction of nuclear power plants 
(Arditi & Kirsinikas, 1985).  
The failure of Watts Bar and Limerick are not isolated incidents of nuclear plant project 
failure. An investigation of 45 nuclear power plants under construction between 1973 and 1982 
revealed that only 2 of the plants finished at or before their original deadline. Figure 3 shows the 
frequency of schedule overrun for the 45 nuclear plants with the most frequent level of overrun 






































Figure 3. Schedule Overrun for Nuclear Power Plants (1973-1982) (NRC, 1982) 
Further analysis of 52 nuclear plants under construction during 1977-1982 reveals that 
for 1370 total progress reports, 513 (37%) showed no net progress (i.e., stagnant backlogs) 
between report periods and 71 (5%) showed declining progress (e.g., increasing backlogs)—
again behavior that could indicate the presence of tipping point dynamics.  
A specific example of the effect of changing governmental regulation in nuclear plant 
construction is the changing requirements for pipe supports. In 1971, a new regulation was 
adopted that required all pipes within a nuclear power plant to be supported (Aron, 1997). This 
included pipes within the reactor containment building (the large concrete dome seen at all US 
nuclear plants). Designers failed to take into account the effect this change would have on plant 
design. One such example is the Shoreham plant in Long Island, New York.  
Construction began in 1972 and was to be completed in the first quarter of 1977. In 
September of 1977, the expected duration was increased by over 12 months due to material 
shortages, labor productivity, and “design changes due to regulatory requirements” (NRC, 
1982). The original estimate of $217 million was well short of the actual $5 billion cost when the 
plant was completed (Aron, 1997). Construction activities were completed in the mid 1980’s, but 
the plant never came on-line due to political pressure over concerns of evacuating Long Island 
in the event of an accident (Aron, 1997). 
Although the plant did not begin construction until 1972, the design was already 
completed and approved before the new pipe support regulations took effect. According to a 
former Vice-President of the architect/engineering/construction firm building the Shoreham 
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2005). As these supports were outside the initial scope, they provide an example of adding new 
tasks.  
Pipe support changes were not limited to the Shoreham plant.  Friedrich et al. (1987) 
referred to the “reengineering and redesign” of pipe supports as a “frequently encountered 
event” in nuclear plant construction. Changing regulations along with changes in market 
conditions helped the economic viability of nuclear plants become suspect. A 1988 study 
(Feldman et al.) suggested that for most nuclear power plants under construction in the United 
States at the time, it would be more economical to either cancel the plants under construction, 
regardless of progress, or modify the plants to burn conventional fuel (coal, gas, or oil). This 
illustrates the potential large impact tipping point dynamics can have on single development 
projects. 
A Simulation Model of Project Tipping Point Dynamics 
Most traditional project-management models, such as the critical path method, are linear 
and cannot adequately predict the effects that increased rework, contamination, and the 
addition of new tasks have on projects. In contrast, systems dynamics is well suited to modeling 
development dynamics. System dynamics has a strong and established history of modeling 
development projects and has been successfully applied to a variety of project management 
issues, including failures in fast track implementation (Ford & Sterman, 1998), poor schedule 
performance (Abdel-Hamid, 1984), and the impacts on project performance of changes 
(Rodrigues & Williams, 1997; Cooper, 1980, 1993a,b,c) and concealing rework requirements 
(Ford & Sterman, 2003a).   
The model is purposefully simple relative to actual practice to expose the relationships 
between tipping point structures, project behavior modes, and management. Therefore, 
although many development processes and the features of project participants and resources 
interact to determine project performance, only those features that describe a particular tipping 
point structure, project management policies, and the fundamental processes they impact are 
included. Simulated performances using different policies are, therefore, considered relative and 
useful for improving understanding and developing insights, but not sufficient for final policy 
design. Complete model equations and documentation are available from the authors or at 
http://ceprofs.tamu.edu/dford/.   
The model consists of three sectors: a workflow sector (Figure 4), a resource allocation 
sector, and a schedule sector. The workflow sector is based on Ford and Sterman’s (1998) 
structure of a development value chain with a rework cycle. Work is initially completed and 
moves from the initial completion backlog3 (IC backlog) to the backlog of work requiring quality 
assurance (QA backlog). A fraction of the work checked by quality assurance is discovered to 
require change and moves into the rework backlog. Completed rework is returned to the QA 
backlog for checking again because rework can reveal previously hidden or create new change 
requirements4. The complement of the checked work found to require rework passes quality 
assurance, is approved, released, and adds to the stock of work approved and released (Work 
                                                
3 Development activity flows represent the completion of a development task. Therefore backlogs, as 
used here, include work in progress. 
4 This creation of additional rework is not contamination because it represents additional rework required 
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Released). Flows between the stocks of IC backlog, QA backlog, RW backlog, and Work 
Released can be constrained by either process rates or resources. Process rates assume 
infinite resources and are the amounts of work available divided by the minimum times required 
to perform a work package. Resource rates are the products of the quantities of resources 
assigned to each activity and resource productivity. See Ford and Sterman (1998) for a more 










































Figure 4.  Work Flows for a Single Project System (based on Ford & Sterman, 1998) 
A unique expansion of this model in the current work is the explicit modeling of adding 
new tasks in a tipping point structure. Adding new tasks creates work that is added to the IC 
backlog during a project. We assume that the amount of work created is proportional to the work 
discovered to require rework:  
Rnt = (Drw) (snt)          (1) 
Where: 
Rnt - rate of adding new tasks due to ripple effects {work packages / week} 
Drw - discover rework rate {work packages / week} 
snt – add-new-tasks strength {work packages created / work packages discovered, or 
dimensionless} 
The add-new-task strength is a project characteristic that describes the amount of 
impact that reworked portions of the project have on the total work required to complete the 
project and, thereby, can be used to describe different project types. It is related to the amount 




= - 347 - 
=
=
foundation and superstructure components of a building would be high compared to the strength 
between the foundation and the heating system.  
Resources are allocated among the initial completion, quality assurance, and rework 
activities proportionally based on the current demand for each of these activities. The desired 
fraction of resources for each activity is the size of the backlog compared to the project backlog 
(ICbacklog+QAbacklog+RWbacklog). For example, if resource productivities are equal and the 
current RW backlog is 40% of the current project backlog, the desired portion of the available 
resources to be allocated to the rework activity is 40%. Applied resource fractions are delayed 
with a first order exponential adjustment toward the desired fractions to reflect reallocation 
delays.  
Schedule pressure is common in development projects. Increased rework is a side effect 
of schedule pressure that can degrade project performance (Cooper, 1994; Graham, 2000; Ford 
& Sterman, 2003b).5 As a project approaches a fixed deadline, schedule pressure increases; 
developers increase the pace of work to meet the deadline. This increases the risk of work 
being completed incorrectly. In the schedule sector, pressure increases with the time required to 
complete the project backlog (tr) and decreases with the time available to complete the project 
backlog (ta). To explicitly model the impacts of schedule pressure on tipping point dynamics, we 
disaggregate the rework fraction (frw) into the sum of a reference rework fraction (frw-r) and the 
schedule-induced rework fraction (frw-s). The reference rework fraction reflects basic project 
complexity. The schedule-induced rework fraction is the additional fraction of work requiring 
change due to schedule pressure. The schedule-induced rework fraction reflects mistakes made 
by developers due to pressures to meet the project deadline. This portion of the rework fraction 
is modeled as the product of schedule pressure and the sensitivity of the rework fraction to 
schedule pressure (srw-s). Forgoing the functions to limit values to 0-100%, the rework fraction 
becomes:  
frw = frw-r + frw-s = frw-r + [((tr / ta)-1) (srw-s) ]      (2) 
Where: 
frw - rework fraction (dimensionless) 
frw-r - reference rework fraction {dimensionless}  
frw-s - rework fraction due to schedule pressure {dimensionless} 
tr - time required to complete project backlog {weeks} 
ta - time available to complete project backlog {weeks} 
srw-s – sensitivity of rework to schedule pressure {dimensionless} 
                                                
5 Schedule pressure can have multiple beneficial and detrimental impacts on project performance which 
can be modeled with additional feedback loops (see Ford, 1995 for examples). The current work models 
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Figure 5 shows the work flow structure (Figure 4) and tipping point feedback structure. 
Feedback loop B1 (Project Progress) withdraws work from the rework cycle. The QA backlog 
increases due to initial completion and rework, causing the QA rate to increase as resources are 
shifted to quality assurance. Increasing QA increases the rate at which work is approved and 
decreases the QA backlog. This balancing loop drives the project to completion as the backlogs 
decline to zero. If no new tasks are added, B1 completes a project as quickly as processes and 

























































Figure 5. A Tipping Point Structure of a Single Development Project 
Loop R1 (Add New Tasks) adds to the total work required to complete the project 
through increases in the discovery of rework and adding new tasks—increasing initial 
completion and, thereby, the QA backlog increases the QA rate, increasing the rate at which 
work is discovered to require rework. This increases the rate at which new tasks are added, 
thereby adding more work to the IC backlog. In the absence of loop B1 (e.g., if the rework 
faction = 100%) loop R1 increases the rework and project backlog infinitely, thereby degrading 
project performance to eventual failure.6 Feedback loops B1 and R1 form a traditional tipping 
point structure that can dramatically change system behavior from being “under control” to being 
“out of control” due to a shift in feedback loop dominance from the balancing loop to the 
reinforcing loop. We show how, through exogenous manipulation of loop dominance, managers 
can regain control of projects with tipping point structures. Loop R2 (Schedule Pressure) can 
increase the strength of the Add New Tasks loop (R1) by increasing the rework fraction as 
                                                
6 The loop dominance analysis discussed here is consistent with the results of a more rigorous analysis 
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described above. The resulting increase in a project’s backlog increases the time required to 
complete the project, increasing schedule pressure. This increases the schedule-induced 
rework fraction and, thereby, the fraction discovered to require rework7. 
Model Testing and Typical Behavior 
The model was tested using standard methods for system dynamics models (Sterman, 
2000). Basing the model on previously tested project models and the literature improves the 
model’s structural similarity to development processes and practices, as do unit consistency 
tests. Extreme condition tests were performed by setting model inputs, such as initial scope or 
total project staff, to extreme values and simulating project behavior. Model behavior remained 
reasonable. The model’s behavior for typical conditions is consistent with previous project 
models and practice (e.g., the common "S"-shaped increase in work released over time shown 
in Figure 6). As a successful project progresses, the backlog initially decreases slowly as the 
value chain and rework structures fill with work, increases progress during stable production, 
and decreases to zero slowly as backlogs empty, indicating that the project is complete. Model 
behavior was also compared to actual project behavior as described by Ford and Sterman 







































Figure 6. Typical Project Model Behavior 
Limited project data prevented calibration to a specific project that experienced tipping 
point dynamics. Therefore, to test the ability of the model to replicate tipping point behavior 
modes, the model was calibrated with reasonable values to reflect a hypothetical project in 
                                                
7 Third and fourth reinforcing loops exist in which the IC backlog and IC rate increase the QA Backlog 
and, thereby, the QA rate and Rework Backlog. These backlogs also increase the project backlog. These 
loops perform like loop R2, but instead of increasing the project backlog through the IC backlog, they 





= - 350 - 
=
=
which the Add New Tasks and Schedule Pressure loops are active. The simulated behavior was 
compared to the behavior of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Watts Bar unit 2 project. The 
similarity between the actual project and simulated behavior modes in Figure 7 supports the 
model’s ability to reflect a failure mode in nuclear power plant construction that could be caused 
by tipping point dynamics. Based on these tests, the model was assessed to be useful for 
























Figure 7. Tipping Point Behavior Mode Test 
Similar to Repenning (2001), project progress is described with the project backlog as a 
fraction of the project’s initial scope. Figure 8 shows the evolution of two types of projects. The 
horizontal axis shows project backlog in the previous time period; the vertical axis shows project 
backlog in the current time period. As an example of reading project behavior from the graph, 
the horizontal and vertical dashed lines show that in one project, the backlog was 80% of the 
scope in the previous time period and 72% in the current time period. All projects begin in the 
center of Figure 8, with backlog equals to their initial scope. Improving projects have decreasing 
backlogs and are reflected by conditions below the diagonal dashed line, when preceding 
project backlogs exceed the current project backlog. The behavior mode of the work released of 
the improving project in Figure 8 is the traditional “S-curve” common in project management 
literature. In contrast, degrading projects are reflected by conditions above the diagonal dashed 
line (when current project backlogs exceed previous project backlogs) and can theoretically 
have an ever-increasing backlog. The behavior mode of the project backlog of the degrading 
project in Figure 8 is an ever-increasing backlog. Successful projects end near the origin,8 when 
there is no more project backlog. Failed projects approach the upper right corner of the graph, 
reflecting continuously increasing backlogs. A project that remains on any point along the 
                                                
8 The project simulation can reach the origin, when (PBt-1 , PBt) = (0,0), but actual projects stop when the 
backlog first reaches zero, when (PBt-1 , PBt) = (x,0) and x>0. This is represented in Figure 6 by a point on 
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diagonal line has a constant project backlog and is stagnant (in net progress terms). An upper 
limit describing project failure has been arbitrarily set at 2, when work remaining to be 
completed is twice the original scope. All simulations in the current work reaching this limit have 
continuously increasing total backlogs and are considered failures. However, this limit may need 
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Figure 8. Evolution of Three Projects near a Project Tipping Point 
In many projects, both loops B1 and R1 are active. In the improving project shown in 
Figure 8, the release loop (B1) is dominant; more work is being approved and removed from the 
rework cycle than is being added by new tasks through loop R1. For the degrading project, the 
Add New Task loop (R1) is dominant; more work is being added to the rework cycle than is 
being approved and released through loop B1. For stagnant projects (e.g. at the center of 
Figure 8), loops B1 and R1 are balanced; work is being removed from the rework cycle at a rate 
equal to the rate at which work is added to the rework cycle. The relationship between these two 
loops can be described using a tipping point. 
Project Tipping Point Conditions 
The tipping point is the condition between dominance by loop B1 (Figure 5) (leading to 
shrinking backlogs and project success) and dominance by loop R1 (leading to growing 
backlogs and failure). Adding new tasks adds work to the project backlog, and approving and 
releasing work withdraws work from the project backlog. Therefore, the tipping point occurs 
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released. The rate at which work is approved and released is the complement of the QA rate 
that is discovered to require rework (DRW)9. Therefore, at the tipping point:  
Rnt = RQA – DRW         (3) 
Where: 
Rnt - Rate of adding new tasks due to ripple effects {work packages/week} 
RQA - quality assurance rate {work packages/week} 
DRW - discover rework rate {work packages/week} 
Temporarily using the aggregate rework fraction (frw), the rework discovery rate (DRW) is 
the product the QA rate (RQA) and the rework fraction. By substitution using equation (1), 
equation (3) becomes: 
(snt)(RQA)(frw) = RQA – (RQA)(frw)       (4) 
Simplification yields a description of the conditions that define the tipping point. 
frw(snt + 1) = 1          (5) 
When the left-hand side of equation (5) exceeds 1, the project is degrading, when less 
than 1 the project is improving, and when equal to 1 the project is stagnant. A project can only 
remain at a tipping point (i.e. frw(snt+ 1) = 1) if loop B1 completes work at exactly the rate that 
loop R1 adds work to the project backlog. The project behavior will bifurcate to failure if loop R1 
dominates or to success if loop B1 dominates. Therefore, the tipping point is an unstable 
equilibrium. 
When the left-hand side of equation (4) exceeds 1 the project is degrading, when less 
than 1 the project is improving, and when equal to 1 the project is stagnant. The tipping point 
conditions are shown graphically in Figure 9. 
                                                
9 See Rahmandad (2005) for a similar project structure with constant addition of work and constrained 
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Figure 9. Basic Project Tipping Point Conditions 
Figure 9 can be used to intuitively explain the behavior of projects near the tipping point. 
The total backlog of projects to the lower left of the solid line decreases, and the project 
improves. The total backlog of projects to the right of the solid line increases, and the project 
degrades. The solid line represents possible tipping point conditions. A project can only remain 
at a tipping point if the loop B1 completes work at exactly the rate as loop R1 adds work to the 
project backlog (Eq. 2). In the absence of forces to keep the project stagnate, small digressions 
from the tipping point conditions in either direction will cause the project to improve or degrade. 
If either loop dominates, total backlogs will increase (R1 dominates) to project failure or 
decrease (B1 dominates) to project completion. Therefore, the tipping point is an unstable 
equilibrium. 
Project conditions that move across the tipping point conditions shown in Figure 9 
experience a change in project behavior mode from increasing to decreasing or vice versa. The 
shape of Figure 9 reveals intuitive insights about project conditions that generate tipping point 
dynamics. The negative slope of the tipping point conditions line indicates that projects that 
have low add-new-task strength (snt) can tolerate a higher fraction of rework (FRW) before 
degrading and projects with low rework fractions can tolerate higher add-new-tasks strengths. 
However, the tipping point relationship between add-new-tasks strength and rework fraction is 
not linear. A small increase in add-new-tasks strength greatly reduces the tolerable rework 
fraction. But as add-new-task strength increases, the tolerable rework fraction decreases more 
slowly, asymptotically toward a value of zero. 
Project Trajectory Reversal and Schedule Pressure 
We next investigate projects that begin on one side of the tipping point but, due to 
endogenous or exogenous influences, are pushed past the tipping point and reverse their 
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reversal is when the status of a project initially improves but later degrades and eventually fails 
(i.e., when an improving, “good,” project degrades, “goes bad”) or vice versa. Project trajectories 
that are monotonically improving or monotonically degrading (e.g., Figure 8) do not describe 
trajectory reversal. However, our study of large complex construction projects such as nuclear 
power plants indicate that trajectory reversal is an important issue.  If project resources and 
productivity are limited and fixed, the basic project tipping point structure described above 
cannot endogenously simulate projects with trajectory reversal. This is because the structure 
lacks a mechanism to shift feedback loop dominance from loop B1 to R1. Exogenous 
influences, additional endogenous dynamic structures, or both, are required to propel projects 
beyond the tipping point and reverse their trajectory.10  
Exogenous Influences on Tipping Point Dynamics  
Exogenous factors can influence the rework fraction or add-new-tasks strength, such as 
changes in project scope during construction or, as with the case of the nuclear plant, changes 
in requirements. An inspection of equation (5) shows that, if a project starts far enough away 
from its tipping point (e.g. FRW (snt+1) <<1) and the increases in the rework fraction and add-
new-tasks strength are small enough, that the project does not cross the tipping point and 
behaves essentially like a monotonically improving project. However, if the magnitude of the 
changes is large enough, the project could be pushed past the tipping point, causing a project 
that initially improved to reverse its trajectory and degrade. However, as will be demonstrated 
next, pushing a project beyond its tipping point is not always sufficient to trap the project there 
and cause project failure.  
Figure 6 shows the behavior of a project that begins with FRW = 0.2 and snt = 1. Applying 
equation (5) (FRW (snt+1) =0.2(1+1) =0.4<1) places the project on the improving side of the 
tipping point (pt. 1 in Figure 10). The project progresses towards completion until, at week 10 
the rework fraction was exogenously raised to 0.6 to reflect a new but temporary problem that 
the development team must address. The tipping point conditions jump to 1.2, pushing the 
project quickly past the tipping point (pt. 2 in Figure 10). The project degrades, and the project 
backlog increases. The project continues to degrade until the rework fraction is exogenously 
returned to the original condition and the tipping point conditions return to their original level (pt. 
3 in Figure 10). Once the project is operating below the tipping point again, it begins to reduce 
the project backlog (pt. 4 in Figure 10), thus improving to completion (pt. 5 in Figure 10). This 
demonstrates how improving projects subjected to large but temporary exogenous increases in 
the rework fraction, add-new-tasks strength, or both can be pushed beyond their tipping point 
and begin to degrade. But, barring structures that prevent a full and immediate recovery of 
those factors, when the exogenous change is removed, the project crosses the tipping point 
again and can improve again. 
                                                
10 Delays that can also cause shifts in feedback-loop dominance by temporarily constraining a strong loop 
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1) Project begins below the tipping point
2)  Temporary problem increases base rework fraction 
and pushes the project above the tipping point.
3)  The temporary problem is solved and the base rework 
fraction returns to the original fraction.
5)  Project 
C l t
4)  Since the base rework is returned to its original 
fraction the project remains the same distance from the 























Figure 10. Project Exogenously Pushed beyond the Tipping Point 
As modeled above, a sustained exogenous impact or another dynamic structure is 
required to cause an improving project to both reverse its trajectory and fail. In contrast to the 
behavior in the example above and in Figure 10, permanent exogenous changes in the rework 
fraction, add-new-tasks strength, or both that keep the project conditions beyond the tipping 
point (i.e. FRW(snt+1)>1) generate project failure. Simulations not shown here for brevity verify 
these results.   
A side-effect of the temporary problem in the example above is that the project will have 
a longer duration than it would have if the rework fraction had not increased. The time projects 
spend beyond the tipping point increases the total required work. If resource quantities and 
productivity is limited, this can cause projects to be completed far later than without the 
trajectory reversal. But, given enough time, the project will finish. This may be a partial 
explanation of projects that are very difficult to terminate and have very poor schedule 
performance (such as the Department of Energy projects described previously). In other cases, 
economic or other types of deadlines may cause these projects to be terminated, such as with 
nuclear plants that were never completed (Nuclear Engineering International, 1995). 
Endogenously Influenced Tipping Point Project Failure 
Some projects reverse their trajectory from improving to degrading and fail with 
continuously increasing project backlogs due to temporary problems. This suggests that 
temporary problems influence projects after the problem is resolved in ways that can cause 
failure. Setting aggressive deadlines is common in development projects. This generates 
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al., 2001; Ford & Sterman, 2003a). Here, we investigate the impacts of schedule pressure due 
to aggressive deadlines on project performance through adding new tasks. Figure 11 shows the 
behavior of two projects (A and B) with different deadlines and, therefore, different amounts of 
schedule pressure. Without schedule pressure (feedback loop R2 inactive), the two projects 
finish in 25 weeks. The expected duration for project A has been reduced by 20% (20 weeks 
instead of 25 weeks). Project B has had its expected duration reduced by 28% (18 weeks). The 
interaction of schedule pressure and the tipping point have a dramatic impact on project 
performance. Project A remains on the improving side of the tipping point and finishes, but 
schedule pressure pushes Project B past the tipping point, causes trajectory reversal, and leads 
to failure. Simulations verify that the amount of schedule pressure that can be absorbed without 
trajectory reversal is related to the distance the project starts away from its tipping point 
conditions. These simulations demonstrate that projects can absorb safely some schedule 
pressure, but that in the presence of a tipping point structure, too much schedule pressure can 
cause projects to fail. The added new tasks–schedule pressure reinforcing loop provides an 
endogenous explanation for how projects that begin in conditions that can lead to success can 
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Project B:  Expected project duration of 28% pushes the 
project over the tipping point and leads to failure.
Project A:  20% decrease in expected project 























Figure 11. Effect of Schedule Pressure on Project Performance Mode 
Compound Project Failure 
Most development projects experience temporary problems, and many have aggressive 
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fail due to a tipping point structure. However, projects that can succeed despite temporary 
problems but do not are of particular interest to development project managers because they 
provide opportunities for improvement. Schedule pressure can trap projects that would finish 
(under normal circumstances) beyond the tipping point and drive them to failure. Figure 12 
describes such a project. When applied individually, a temporary problem (Figure 10) or 
moderate schedule pressure (Project A in Figure 11) do not initiate permanent project 
degradation to failure. However, their combined impacted is enough to permanently push the 












0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2















1) Project begins below the 
tipping point.
2)  Temporary problem increases base rework 
fraction and pushes the project above the 
tipping point.
3)  The temporary problem is solved and the 
base rework fraction returns to the original 
fraction but shedule pressure has moved the 
project closer to the tipping point.
4)  The schedule pressure continues to 
increase and finally pushes the project past the 























Figure 12. Interactive Impact of a Temporary Problem and Schedule Pressure on a 
Project 
Consider a development project with an aggressive deadline that experiences an 
unexpected problem that temporarily increases the rework fraction. The project (see Figure 12) 
begins below the tipping point (pt. 1) and improves. In week 10, an exogenous temporary 
problem is encountered that pushes the project over the tipping point (pt. 2). The project begins 
to build project backlog, degrade, and increase schedule pressure. When the problem is 
resolved and the temporary increase in the rework fraction is removed, the project dips below 
the tipping point and begins to improve again (pt.3), but remains closer to the tipping point line 
than its previous position. This is due to the increased project backlog generated by the 
temporary problem; this increases the schedule pressure and, therefore, the rework fraction and 
added new tasks.  In contrast to the project without schedule pressure, the rework fraction 
increases after the temporary problem is resolved due to the higher schedule pressure. This 
activates loop R2, increasing the addition of new tasks, project backlog, and schedule pressure. 
Eventually, project conditions exceed the tipping point again (pt. 4), and the project crosses the 
tipping point a second time, this time due to endogenous causes. The evolution of percent 












































1) Project begins below the tipping 
point (t=0).
2)  Temporary problem increases base 
rework fraction and pushes the project 
above the tipping point (t=10).
3)  Temporary problem is solved and 
the base rework fraction returns to the 
original fraction (t=15).
4)  Shedule pressure has moved the project closer 
to the tipping point then the original conditions. 5)  Schedule pressure continues to 
increase and finally pushes the project 
past the tipping point  to failure (t=27).
6) Project degrades to failure
 
Figure 13. Project Trajectory Reversal Percent Complete 
The behavior pattern in Figure 1311 is similar to the behavior of the TVA's Watts Bar unit 
2 project shown in Figure 1. This shows that the combination of a tipping point structure and 
ripple effects can cause projects to fail. A project experiencing this type of behavior (ever-
increasing backlogs and decreasing percent complete) would be faced with making major 
changes (i.e., increasing resources, scope reduction, revising project deadline) or terminating 
the project. Either way, the project would likely be considered a failure (increasing costs, lost 
revenues due to delays) and negatively impact all involved entities.  
We have demonstrated several scenarios in which an improving project can experience 
trajectory reversal and degrade to failure. Schedule pressure, an endogenous influence, can 
also push a project to failure. The experience shown in Figure 12 reflects a common problem 
that can be generated by a simple feedback structure. In the next section, we use this problem 
as the basis for testing strategies for managing development projects near a tipping point to 
avoid project failure or save projects that are degrading.  
Project Management near Tipping Points 
A review of current literature reveals several strategies for addressing tipping point 
failure in single development projects. These strategies for tipping point avoidance can be 
                                                
11 As defined for Figure 13, the Project Percent Complete is the work released as a fraction of the sum of 
the scope and added work. The Project Percent Complete can increase if projects are just slightly beyond 
the tipping point and if a large fraction of the new tasks added to the project backlog are simultaneously 
being approved and released. This can be shown by disaggregating the project backlog into the scope, 
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divided into avoiding tipping points through project design, resource management, backlog 
management, and schedule management. 
Avoiding Tipping Points through Project Design 
Avoiding tipping point conditions such as those described above entails the selection or 
design of development projects with relatively low rework fractions and added new tasks. 
Project selection may include an assessment of project complexity and interdependence and 
their impacts on the probability of success. Some projects or portions of projects may have 
characteristics that allow this strategy. For example, construction projects often use relatively 
simple technologies and processes to constrain rework fractions, and project planning 
purposefully keeps these operations separate to constrain ripple effects. Even projects with 
inherently high rework fractions and added new tasks can be designed to apply this strategy 
through methods such as modular design (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Modular design develops 
projects as sub-systems that can be adjusted independently with minimal impact on the design 
as a whole. By designing projects with loose dependencies, if a design change does arise, it 
can be corrected with minimal impact on other systems. Figure 6 helps illustrate how a modular 
project with relatively low add-new-task strength would be able to tolerate a higher rework 
fraction without crossing the tipping point (i.e., it would reside in the lower-left of the chart). In 
the model, modular designed projects would have a lower add-new-task strength and would, 
therefore, be insulted from additional work added by the ripple effect. Modular design allows 
complex projects (with high rework fractions) to progress because a reduction in added new 
tasks has been designed into the project.  
An example of modular design from the automotive industry is Toyota’s method for 
designing components of a new car model. During the design of a new model, Toyota will 
provide their brake-system supplier with specifications regarding the weight of the car, the 
desired stopping distance from a given speed, and how much space the brake system can 
occupy in the wheel assembly (Womack et al., 1991).  The brake supplier can change the 
design of the brake system without impacting other project components as long as the required 
specifications are met. This example demonstrates the concept of robustness which we apply to 
project design. 
Robustness in Project Design 
Taguchi et al. (2000) defines robustness as “the state where the product/process design 
is minimally sensitive to factors causing variability.” The research of robustness in new product 
development has been largely limited to the robustness of the final product (Lou et. al., 2005; 
Swan et al., 2005). The current work expands the concept of robustness to project design and 
measures the protection that the robustness of a project provides from tipping point failure. An 
inspection of equation (5) suggests that, if a project starts far enough away from its tipping point 
(i.e. frw(snt+1)<<1) and increases in the rework fraction and the addition of new tasks strength 
are small, the project will not cross the tipping point and will monotonically improve. However, if 
the magnitude of the changes is large enough, the project could be pushed past the tipping 
point. By modeling robustness (rtp) as the distance between project conditions and the tipping 
point, equation (5) can be rearranged to provide an intuitive meaning of project robustness 
against tipping point-induced failure: 








rtp – project robustness to tipping point-induced failure {dimensionless} 
The right side of equation (6) represents 100% of the project’s capacity to tolerate 
additional new tasks. This capacity has been disaggregated into the three parts on the left side 
of equation (6): 1) capacity fraction absorbed by rework (frw), 2) capacity fraction absorbed by 
addition of new tasks (frw * snt), and 3) the unutilized capacity fraction that provides robustness 
(rtp).When rtp is positive, the project is below the tipping point (improving); when it is zero, the 
project is at the tipping point (stagnant); and when it is negative, the project is above the tipping 
point (degrading). For example, suppose a project has a fixed 20% reference rework fraction 
(frw-r = 0.2) and a fixed add-new-tasks strength (snt) of 1. Applying equation (6), this project 
begins 0.6 from the tipping point (has an initial robustness of 60%). Given these conditions, the 
project could tolerate schedule pressure-driven increases in the rework fraction of up to 30% 
(making frw = 50%) without crossing the tipping point.  
Equation (6) also provides a means of analyzing the effects of different variables on 
project robustness. Robustness can vary significantly from initial conditions during a project. For 
example, schedule pressure can increase the fraction of work requiring change (frw) and, 
thereby, reduce robustness (equation 6). The minimum distance that project conditions come to 
the tipping point during the project represents a project’s most vulnerable conditions. Therefore, 
a project’s minimum distance from a tipping point is a better measure of project robustness than 
the initial distance. Figure 14 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis of project robustness to 
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Ref. rework fraction = 0.2
Add new tasks strength = 1
Sensitivity to schedule pressure = 0.1
Deadline = 25
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Figure 14. Sensitivity Analysis Results 
The horizontal axis of Figure 14 represents the percent change from base-case values 
of the reference rework fraction, add-new-tasks strength, rework sensitivity to schedule 
pressure, deadline without flexibility, and flexibility of deadline. The vertical axis represents the 
project robustness or protection from tipping point-induced failure. For the base case, the 
robustness at the beginning of the project (60%) is reduced by schedule pressure during the 
project to a minimum of 51%. Values which “fall off” the bottom of the chart reflect negative 
robustness, when the project has crossed the tipping point and failed. The sensitivity analysis 
reveals two important features of the relationships between the control variables and minimum 
project robustness against tipping point-induced failure. First, with the exception of deadline 
flexibility, each variable has a threshold value, beyond which robustness quickly becomes 
negative. The threshold values for minimum robustness sensitivity to schedule pressure and 
add-new-tasks strength are 250% and 120% of the base-case conditions, respectively (not 
shown for clarity). In this analysis, deadline flexibility does not have a threshold value because 
the base-case project succeeds with no deadline flexibility. Therefore, adding flexibility cannot 
degrade performance. Second, within the robust ranges, the control levers vary in their impacts 
on robustness. By inspection of Figure 14, minimum project robustness is most sensitive to the 
reference rework fraction, then add-new-tasks strength, then rework sensitivity to schedule 








Resource management includes altering the quantities of resources, their productivities, 
altering resource priorities to meet resource demands, anticipating future resource demands, 
and adjusting resources from current to needed applications. One reasonable response to a 
project that has crossed the tipping point is to add more resources to the project.  The 
justification would be that since a project has more work, more resources are needed to 
complete the work. Model simulations show that increasing a project’s resource level when a 
project crosses the tipping point can “save” the project, but this must be approached carefully. If 
adding resources does not reduce the rework fraction adequately through increased expertise, 
(for example) reduced schedule pressure, or other factors, the tipping point dynamics remain 
effectively the same. This can often be the case. Brooks (1982) states that, “adding manpower 
to a late software project makes it later.” Likewise, if inexperienced resources are added to a 
project, particularly one that is complex, the amount of discovered rework could increase 
(Graham, 2000; Lyneis et al., 2001). In these cases, adding resources to a project that has 
begun to degrade would increase the rate of degradation. More resources making more 
mistakes would drive the project beyond the tipping point faster than fewer resources. 
Therefore, managers must be careful when adding resources to a project near tipping points. 
Often the preceding strategy is unavailable because resource quantities for development 
projects are limited or fixed. A second strategy is to allocate resources to maximize the flows of 
work through the project. Certain backlogs could be given priority to resources based upon a 
manager’s understanding of the critical aspects of the system. Black and Repenning (2001) 
studied this policy in multi-project systems. Repenning (2001) argues that “creating ‘fire-
resistant [tipping point resistant]’ [new product development] systems requires the development 
of more dynamic methods of resource planning.” He suggests that this planning method use the 
present state of the system to forecast the future resource needs. The basic model as described 
above follows this recommendation. In the basic model, managers are assumed to allocate the 
same fraction of resources to each activity as the activity’s current backlog contributes to the 
project backlog.  
A simple and reasonable extension of this policy is to assume that managers base 
allocations on their forecasts of resource needs at a time in the future. This is consistent with 
Cooper’s (1994) suggestion that “developing an information system to forecast resources 
committed to known projects as well as resource availability as a function of time is no easy 
task, but it is essential.” Thomke and Fujimoto (2000) suggest shifting resources to earlier parts 
of projects as the key to success, stating “faster product development can be achieved with an 
earlier generation of problem-and-solution related information, particularly if it involves critical 
path activities.” Joglekar and Ford (2005) use a control-theory model and system dynamics to 
evaluate the impacts of forecasting resource demand on project schedule performance. 
Sterman’s (2000, p. 634-636) structure for modeling trends is adopted12 and the resulting trend 
linearly extrapolated from current backlog sizes into the future, the time required to reallocate 
resources. Sterman (2000) describes and explains the model structure and the equations that 
govern the resource forecasting system. 
                                                
12 The exception to the use of Sterman’s trend structure is that only two exponential smoothing loops 
(rather than three) are used.  Sterman’s structure uses the third exponential loop to smooth “noisy” data 
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Resource Management Impacts on a Degrading Project 
We simulated the potentially successful project (that became trapped beyond the tipping 
point and failed) (Figure 12) across a range of resource adjustment times and demand 
forecasting policies from no forecasting to forecasting with long-time horizons.  As shown in 
Figure 15, resource forecasting can save the project.  The project begins below the tipping point 
(pt. 1). At some point, a temporary problem is encountered that pushes the project past the 
tipping point (pt. 2). Once this problem is resolved, the project returns below the tipping point. 
Schedule pressure pushes the project close to the tipping point (pt. 4) after the project recovers 
from the temporary problem. As RW and QA backlogs begin to increase, resources are shifted 
far enough in advance and fast enough to prevent the backlogs (through schedule pressure) 
from pushing a project across the tipping point. A policy that uses four weeks of backlog history 
to develop a trend that is projected four weeks into the future can save the project if adjusted 
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1)  Project begins below the 
tipping point.
3)  The temporary problem is solved and the base 
rework fraction returns to the original fraction.
2)  Temporary problem increases base rework 
fraction and pushes the project above the 
tipping point.
4)  Resources are adjusted to prevent the build 
up of backlog from increasing the schedule 
pressure to a point that would push the project 
past the tipping point.























Figure 15. Use of Resource Forecasting to Save Project 
Initial results show that longer trend adjustment times (i.e., a slow reacting manager) 
prevent the trend from reacting quickly enough to the increases in backlogs to allow resources 
to be allocated fast enough to save the project.  Shorter trend adjustments (i.e., a quick reacting 
manager) pull the project farther away from the tipping point.  This suggests that managers 
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Resource Adjustment Times 
The time required to shift resources across development activities also impacts 
performance. Lee, Ford, and Joglekar (2004) found that resource adjustment times can have 
important impacts on project schedule performance.  Their model simulations identified that 
there exists optimal resource adjustment times that minimize project duration over a range of 
project complexities. Reducing resource adjustment times while still utilizing proportional 
resource allocation policies can also save the project. Figure 16 shows the problem project 
(Figure 12) with a resource adjustment time reduced from 4 weeks to 3 weeks. Faster 
adjustments of resources towards target levels cause the schedule pressure to decrease after 
the removal of the temporary problem (Figure 16 pt. 4) and saves the project from continuous 
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1 ) Project begins below the 
tipping point.
2)  Temporary problem increases base rework fraction and 
pushes the project above the tipping point.
3)  The temporary problem is solved and the base 
rework fraction returns to the original fraction.
5)  Project Complete
4)  Schedule pressure has pushed the project 
closer to the tipping point but it is not strong 























Figure 16. Use of Decreased Resource Adjustment Time to Save Project 
Both resource forecasting and reduced staff adjustment times provide managers levers 
that can be used to save failing projects. Forecasting resources is somewhat straight forward, 
provided a manager can make a reasonable estimate of expected future work. From the 
authors’ own experience the success of this policy is highly dependant on the accuracy of the 
estimate. One must also ensure that a change in the projected trend is reflective of changing 
resource requirements.  Reducing staff adjustment times can be more challenging than 








Backlog management involves canceling work or releasing defective work. Work 
cancellation is a reduction during the project of features or scope of a project. Model simulations 
(not shown here for brevity) show that, if enough work is canceled, that canceling defective work 
can prevent a project from being overwhelmed with rework. As expected, projects nearer the 
tipping point required the cancellation of more work than those farther away. Black and 
Repenning (2001) found similar results using work cancellation in a multi-project system.  
Schedule Management 
One factor that controls schedule pressure is the project deadline. Both Cooper (1994) 
and Graham (2000) argue that setting realistic project deadlines reduces the amount of rework 
on a project. Therefore, an important part of schedule management is monitoring the project 
deadline and ensuring that it is realistic. One way to ensure a realistic deadline is to implement 
a flexible deadline. A flexible deadline is dependent upon the amount of work left to be 
completed in a project. A rigid deadline does not take into account changes or delays in a 
project caused by rework and added new tasks. Flexible deadlines take these effects into 
account by adjusting the expected completion date based upon the time required to complete 
the total project backlog. To model this flexibility, the project deadline moves toward the 
expected completion date at a rate based on the flexibility of the deadline and the difference 
between the expected completion data and deadline. The effectiveness of flexible deadlines in 
saving the problem project (Figure 12) was tested. Figure 17 shows how a flexible deadline 
prevents the increased backlog due to the temporary problem from increasing schedule 
pressure. This prevents schedule pressure from building up to a point that would drive the 
rework fraction high enough to push the project beyond the tipping point. This suggests that 
managers can use deadline flexibility to recover projects from degradation initiated by crossing 
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Figure 17. Use of Flexible Schedule on Project Past the Tipping Point 
Tipping-point Management in the Nuclear Plant Construction Industry 
Unlike Watts Bar #2, Limerick Unit #2 was ultimately completed. A review of the 
methods used to complete the unit reveals the use of several of the tipping point management 
policies previously discussed. Construction of Limerick Unit #2 was resumed in February of 
1986, and the unit was completed by August of 1989 by Bechtel. To complete the unit, Bechtel 
implemented several of the solutions previously presented. The overall backlog to be completed 
was reduced by eliminating many of the required pipe supports through an advanced support 
design (Clarey, 1987) illustrating the use of backlog management. Bechtel also increased the 
non-manual manpower on the project by 300% a year before increasing the manual workforce. 
Nearly two-thirds of this increase was in the form of engineering and construction management 
personnel (Clarey, 1987) which improved the project’s work planning. Once manual work 
began, all complex installations were thoroughly reviewed by engineers to reduce overall 
rework, and design engineers were placed on all working shifts to resolve any constructability 
issues that arose (Clarey, 1987). This illustrates the concept of increasing manpower in a way 
that potentially reduces the rework and ripple effects of the project. 
Conclusions  
Tipping point structures are integrated with single development project dynamics to 
examine project behavior modes. The tipping point is useful because it allows comparison of 
project failure due to different causes. Rework and the addition of new tasks can combine to 
push projects to fail. By understanding these failure mechanisms, potentially robust policies are 
examined that can decrease the risk of failure for projects near the tipping point threshold.  
Successful policies were those that avoided the tipping point by reducing rework and ripple 
effect or those that reduced backlogs by effectively managing resources. 
The policies tested provide several managerial implications. Tipping point conditions 
(Eq. (4)) support the use of modular design in the development of complex products. By 
reducing the ripple effect, modular design would allow more aggressive projects to be pursued 
with reduced risk of failure.  As described in the discussion of Toyota’s brake system design, 
modular design allows concurrent development of project tasks with minimal interdependence.  
Project managers would benefit from preliminary designs which set project specifications to 
allowing concurrent modular design. The work also contributes a preliminary test of robustness 
as a measure of future project performance. Our results show that robustness may be a good 
measure of a project's protection from tipping point failure. Future research in this area should 
focus on operationalizing robustness for use across a wide range of project types. This future 
work could provide project managers with a method of evaluating the failure potential of 
projects.  
Proper resource management can play an important role in project success. Resource 
forecasting (with quick identification of changing trends) has the potential to further insulate 
projects from the tipping point. Model simulations show that the most successful policies are 
those which are short in hindsight and forecast farther into the future. However, one limit of the 
model used here is that it benefits from data free of the “noise” typically associated with actual 
project tracking reports. Managers must be careful to ensure that a perceived project trend 
change is an actual change in project progression and not normal oscillations in project 
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Resource adjustment times were also found to be potentially effective in responding to 
projects vulnerable to tipping point dynamics. Quicker adjustment times for both proportional 
and forecasted resource allocation policies were beneficial in preventing projects subject to 
schedule pressure from crossing the tipping point. Again, the model is limited in that it does not 
take into account the negative effects (worker morale, lost production time, etc.) of shifting 
resources.  Other work (Lee et al., 2004) has shown that there is an optimal adjustment time for 
resources, remaining below which can be detrimental to a project. While flexible resources can 
be beneficial to a project, the key for managers is to ensure that resources are be adjusted in an 
efficient manner. 
Finally, realistic deadlines can help prevent a project from being overwhelmed with 
schedule pressure. Managers need to carefully consider how changes in work volume, through 
either increased rework or scope changes, affect a project’s deadline.  Model simulations show 
that managers should resist the temptation to strive for schedules which have become 
unrealistic due to drastic changes in a project’s work volume.  This is supported by other 
research (Lyneis et al., 2001; Graham, 2000).  
The model structure used in this work has several limitations. This includes the 
assumption that all work released is of one quality. This prevents a policy investigation similar to 
Black and Repenning (2001) of releasing lower quality work in a single project system. In 
addition, the model does not take into account work that must be redone due to rework. 
Improved models that take into account these conditions are needed to fully examine polices 
that govern single project development. Future research can improve model structure 
consistency with actual projects and calibrate the model to practice.  
Tipping point dynamics can strongly influence the behavior and performance of 
individual development projects, and sometimes determine their success or failure. Continued 
improvement in the understanding of tipping point dynamics can lead to better development, 
project management and performance.  
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